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Child Support Guidelines: The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly
DOUGLAS W. ALLEN* & MARGARET F. BRINIG**
Abstract
Child support guideline systems do more than simply determine the
amount of income to be transferred from the noncustodial to the custodi-
al household. They create incentives, one way or another, for spouses to
divorce and seek custody and support payments. We examine three cases
found in North America, and find that the common method of income
shares provides a decent guideline that does not create any perverse incen-
tives for divorce. Percentage-of-obligor-income methods do worse than
other systems, and can cause increases in divorce rates for families in
which one spouse earns a high income. Finally, the Canadian system,
which is designed to transfer large amounts of net wealth, creates very
large negative incentives for marriage stability.
. Introduction
As two students and supporters of the family and family law, we rec-
ognize that the legal apparatus regulating family life is often designed to
handle social problems arising from family breakdown. We applaud pub-
lic policy actions when they result in good intimate and parent-child rela-
tionships. However, every action that is taken to resolve a family issue-
whether single-parent poverty, loss of custody and contact, or loveless
marriages, to name a few-creates with it a set of incentives for the deci-
sion makers of the household. These incentives can support the general
institutional structure of the family and encourage existing families to
remain successful, or assist troubled and failed families to transition to a
* Burnaby Mountain Professor of Economics, Simon Fraser University. Thanks to
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workable second-best solution for their personal relationships. However,
family regulations can also work the other way. They can create incen-
tives that lead to bad behaviors, attempts to capture family wealth, and
ultimately family breakdown. Often, the laws that work this way are cre-
ated with good intentions, but with little concern given to individual
incentives.
The experience with Child Support Guidelines (CSGs) over the past
thirty years in North America provides a nice example of how different
variations on the same theme can lead to significant differences in behav-
ior within the family. In many U.S. cases, CSGs were designed in such a
way that they provided support for children within the custodial home,
while leaving the wealth of the noncustodial home relatively intact. On
the other hand, CSGs concerned mostly with maximizing the transfer of
wealth to the custodial home created net wealth transfers that amounted to
unintended spousal support.' In the effort to generate more generous child
support and fight poverty through guidelines, an unfortunate, but pre-
dictable, incentive resulted: individuals married to high-income spouses
within marginal marriages were encouraged to divorce. Subsequently,
noncustodial parents and their supporters began to retaliate in courts and
the media.
These incentives stem from (usually) well-intentioned desires to pro-
vide adequate support for children of broken families, coupled with fail-
ures to appreciate some features of families. We show here that, in fact,
couples' divorce patterns follow the incentives we think are being created
by states with faulty guidelines. We begin with a brief description of
guidelines and the problems faced by policy makers drafting or updating
them. We follow this discussion with three examples of ways two of the
problems have been resolved and finally present our predictions and sup-
porting evidence gleaned from large, national, longitudinal surveys in
both the United States and Canada. We show that a few simple differences
can lead to good, bad, and really ugly guidelines.
II. What Is a Guideline?
On the surface, a guideline is very simple: a mere table of numbers. For
example, Table 1 shows the first four rows of the Virginia guidelines.
Down the left-most column run the combined monthly earnings of the
couple. Along the top row are listed the number of children up to six.
Every guideline table has this basic format, although the actual details
vary from one jurisdiction to another. Some states use gross income; oth-
1. Some might quibble with the word "unintended." In some jurisdictions, child support is
considered "family support," and the spousal support is, therefore, intended.
Child Support Guidelines: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 137
ers adjust income in various ways to account for fixed mandatory expens-
es in a month, and there may or may not be a cap on income or the num-
ber of children. The bottom line, however, is that guidelines amount to a
simple table from which any family can determine the amount of child
support.
Table 1: Virginia Child Support Guidelines, 2010
Combined
Monthly NUMBER OF CHILDREN
Gross Income One Two Three Four Five Six
0-599 65 65 65 65 65 65
600 110 111 113 114 115 116
650 138 140 142 143 145 146
700 153 169 170 172 174 176
Table 1 points to the great appeal of a guideline system: it is so simple.
A CSG means that judges, attorneys, the couple, and others do not have
to research and debate payment levels. Given that guidelines are almost
always couched in scientific rhetoric, the tables are not only simple, but
also they come with authority. 2 The rules, however, hide all the assump-
tions that lie behind them. These assumptions determine the entire set of
guideline values, and these create incentives between the husband and
wife over decisions to divorce and seek custody. Understanding these
assumptions is necessary to understand the incentives.3
III. Three Analytic Issues in Creating Guidelines
Once a legal jurisdiction decides to proceed with the creation or refor-
mulation of a CSG, the committee put in charge immediately runs into
several logistical problems. To create any table of guidelines, the group,
and later the legislature or other rule-making body, needs to make three
2. For example, the Indiana Rules of Court for Child Support Rules and Guidelines states,
in part: "In developing these Guidelines, a great deal of reliance was placed on the research of
Thomas J. Espenshade, (Investing in Children, Urban Institute Press, 1984) generally consid-
ered the most authoritative study of household expenditure patterns," available at http://www.
in.gov/judiciary/rules/child-support/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).
3. In reality, guideline tables are only one part of a set of regulations that define child sup-
port. These regulations can be quite complicated and may include add-ons to the tables that can
change the values.
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critical decisions with respect to the costs of children, a sharing rule, and
the value of children. These decisions get built into the table numbers and
systematically determine the income transferred between the noncustodi-
al and custodial household-whether or not they reflect the reality of child
support in general or in the specific case. Depending on how the three crit-
ical issues are handled, the guideline transfers can vary from reasonably
handling child costs to becoming a form of spousal support. When guide-
lines end up transferring excessive amounts of wealth, they can even cre-
ate incentives to divorce. This section considers each of these issues.
A. Issue I: Estimating The Costs of Children
Often the simplest concepts are the most difficult to measure. Every
parent casually refers to the "cost of raising children," and the concept
has become part of our everyday speech. However, there is no unique
"cost of a child," either in a financial or broader sense. This problem
stems from two major sources. First, there is no unique or obvious way
to allocate "joint," or shared, costs within a household. Children typical-
ly share the same roof, get food from the same refrigerator, and watch the
same television(s) as their parents. It would be an error to assign the costs
of shelter, food, and entertainment either all to the child or all to the par-
ent. Unfortunately, there's no theory to tell us how these costs should be
split either. The ultimate decision must be based on some noneconomic
criteria.
Second, and just as fundamental, the actual amount spent on raising a
child in an intact family is determined by joint decisions within the house-
hold. These decisions are not exogenous (given from outside) and are
often not observable. Rather, they depend on household wealth, social
mores, neighborhood effects, the preferences of the parents, and, at some
point, the preferences of the child. As a result, it is more correct to speak
of the "expenditures" made on children within a household, rather than
their costs. Once the notion of expenditures is introduced, however, the
question of "what expenditures are appropriate" must be answered using
noneconomic criteria.
Still, determining expenditures on children presents at least a tractable
economic problem. Economists have a concept called an "expenditure
function," which, in theory, provides the dollars required for achieving
some outcome (like the raising of a child), conditional on the characteris-
tics of the household. In theory, an expenditure function is well-defined.
In practice, most of the parameters of the function are unobservable (like
the utility, or satisfaction, of individual household members). Still, econ-
omists estimate these functions based on a barrage of (often unrealistic)
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assumptions. Although the use of a general household expenditure func-
tion based on simplifying assumptions is the theoretically proper method
for estimating the expenditures on children, no guidelines are based on
anything so sophisticated. These things are often considered by the com-
mittees and experts designing the laws, but are often rejected for being too
complicated.'
In practice, especially during the early years of guideline development,
the solution was to empirically estimate "reduced forms" of an expendi-
ture equivalence scale.' Often these estimates were crude in terms of the
margins over which equivalence was measured. In addition, when actual
functions were estimated, they tended to be simple linear ones; that is, as
household income increased, it was assumed the expenditures on children
increased by a constant amount.
Early empirical estimates of expenditures on children mostly relied on
the work of Thomas Espenshade. 6 Espenshade assumed that differences in
food consumption across households were reasonably constant and there-
fore fell as a fraction of income when income increased. When house-
holds spent a small fraction of income on food, he reasoned, they had a
higher standard of living. When households of different types spent the
same fraction of income on food, they had the same standard of living. In
this way, the incremental expenditures on children can be estimated by
comparing households with and without children, and finding the income
difference that is necessary to hold food expenditures at a constant frac-
tion. More specifically, Espenshade estimated the fraction, based on data
from the 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Surveys, to generate a series of
"Engel equations" to determine the amount of food consumed as a func-
tion of family characteristics. Using these estimates, he determined the
minimum number of dollars a married couple with one child, for example,
required to have an equal standard of living to that of a childless couple.
This determined the marginal cost of one child. This exercise was repeat-
ed for different numbers of children and different family formations.'
4. So right off the bat we see the normative judgments required to arrive at a guideline:
you cannot define costs exactly, so use expenditures; you cannot estimate true expenditure func-
tions, so simplify; you cannot use the simplified functions in practice, so use reduced linear
forms.
5. An equivalence scale is a ratio of two expenditure functions. It provides a number that
gives the fraction of income necessary for one household type to have the same standard of liv-
ing as another. For example, if an equivalence scale for a household of two people is 1.4, then
a two-member household requires 40% more income than a single household to maintain the
same standard of living.
6. THOMAS ESPENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN: NEw ESTIMATES OF PARENTAL
EXPENDITURES (1984).
7. Note that this procedure estimates the "marginal" or "change" in expenditures that are
brought about by children. This importantly imputes all of the fixed costs of the household (such
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Early estimates of child-related expenditures thus usually amounted to
a series of percentages. For example, household expenses might increase
by 20%, 25%, or 35% if there are one, two, or three children. Later, actu-
al equivalence functions were estimated. In practice, given the limited
computer power of the time, jurisdictions simply estimated ad hoc linear
equivalence scales. That is, most guidelines use what are called "reduced
form" linear scales that do not rely on estimating an expenditure function
directly. These scales usually take the form: a+b(n-2), where "n" is the
total number of persons in the household, "a" is the number necessary to
make a two-member household equivalent in terms of goods and services
to a single member household, and "b" is the "marginal cost" of extra
members in the household. Although an equivalence scale could depend
on many things, usually only a small number of factors are considered.
For example, in most states, these scales depend on just two parameters:
the number of children and income.8
B. Issue H: The Choice of Apportions
Once the "costs of children" are "determined," the question arises: in
what way should these costs be shared? Several methods have been sug-
gested, and the justifications for each range from ease of use, transparen-
cy, equity, concern for child welfare, and marginal tax rates of noncusto-
dial parents.9 No single method addresses each issue, and, in fact, they are
often in conflict with each other. Within the United States the two most
common forms of splitting costs are the Income Shares (IS) model, and
the Percentage of Obligor Income (PO or Wisconsin) model. Less often
used models include the Melson (Delaware) model and several hybrid
methods.
Depending on the sharing rule chosen, the table reflecting the values
may generate inequitable awards that transfer too much or too little to the
as heat, the house itself, and the refrigerator) to the parents. All guidelines are based on this
assumption, and Espenshade's methodology was used in the early guideline models. It has
become more common to use one developed by Rothbarth, which performs a similar exercise
using different measures of standards of living (e.g., different levels of expenditure on adult
clothing depending upon whether one purchases from discount department stores or designer
boutiques).
8. One very obvious factor and one that is considered by attorneys in settlement for
amounts above the guideline levels or in setting in advance how the amounts will vary in suc-
ceeding years is the age of the child. Once cribs and high chairs are purchased (fixed expenses),
children become progressively more expensive as they become older. They are both larger
(requiring more fabric in their clothes and sneakers) and demand more expensive things (com-
pare the cost of plastic blocks to stuff in toy bottles with TI-90 calculators).
9. Marsha Garrison, An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L.
REv. 41 (1998); see also Marsha Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 33
FAM. L.Q. 157 (1999).
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custodial household. Sharing rules naturally have a number of assump-
tions built into them. These include assumptions regarding the relative
incomes of the custodial and noncustodial parents; the role of taxes; child
tax credits; the costs borne by custodial versus noncustodial households.
C. Issue III: The Value of Children
The third major assumption implicitly dealt with in all guidelines
relates to the treatment of utility parents experience by living with their
children. The theoretically correct way to account for the cost of children
is to begin by recognizing that children enter the utility function of their
parents (they have value), and then construct an expenditure function. In
practice, however, this requires the comparison of unobservable utilities
across individuals-an intractable task."o
The alternative used by those designing guidelines is to exclude chil-
dren as a valuable marital good (i.e., they assume children are of no value
to their parents)." When children are assumed to be a cost only, the trans-
fers to the custodial household are increased relative to a more accurate
measure.12
10. Just because this is difficult does not mean that it is not real. Parents behave as if chil-
dren are valuable: they protect them, enjoy them, and mourn when they are lost. Parents claim
children are valuable: many parents say that the value of their children is infinite, that they
would not trade being a parent of their particular son(s) and daughter(s) for any amount of
money. This value could be approximated by looking at the difference in happiness, or psycho-
logical health, experienced by parents who live with and away from their children. Some effort
to measure the very considerable reduction in men's happiness from loss of custody is found in
Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, "I Only Want Trust": Norms, Trust and Autonomy, 32 J.
Socio-EcoNoMics 471 (2003) (increase of half a standard deviation in father's depression, con-
sidering all other likely factors when a custody order or agreement gives the child's mothers
custody). Other possible indications of the seriousness in which loss is felt include the amounts
spent on litigating custody decisions, on advocating joint custody, and so forth (though part of
these expenses no doubt also reflect animosity toward the custodial parents).
11. This is not to say that children are not costly. Custodial parents trying to date or form
new families, pursue full-time employment or higher education, and so forth, are hindered
because of the presence of children. Children lead to both costs and benefits, however. Our point
is that the guidelines recognize the costs (and try to estimate them), but they assume there are
no benefits.
12. This is likely the full intention of the assumption. Use of expenditure models based on
intact families does not count the losses due to the simple fact that there are now two house-
holds, rather than one, living on the same set of incomes. Our point is that when just consider-
ing the "adequacy" of the award, incentives are often ignored. By assuming the utility of chil-
dren is zero, incentives are created.
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IV. Three Examples: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly' 3
A. Indiana: The Good
Indiana began developing child support guidelines in 1985 in response
to the 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments that required all
states to create advisory guidelines for judges.' 4 However, the state guide-
lines'5 did not take effect until October 1989,16 and became a rebuttable
presumption of the amount due pursuant to the 1988 Family Support Act."
Indiana is typical of the model child-support state. It uses the
Espenshade estimates of household standards-of-living. Hence, at the
very lowest income level of the table, child support payments are 12%,
18%, 22%, for one, two, and three children. Indiana continues to use the
Espenshade estimates, but reviews have shown they match with more
updated ones.' 8 Most importantly, the shares allocated to costs of children
are assumed to fall as household income rises. This is an example of
something called "Engel's law," an empirical observation from the nine-
teenth century that the share-of-food expenditures to total income declines
as income increases. The effect of this can be seen in Figure 1.
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13. The subtitle comes from a Sergio Leone western film of the same name (1966).
14. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667).
15. See Indiana Rules of Court, Child Support Rules and Guidelines, available at http:
www.in.gov/judiciary/ruies/child-support/.
16. For a complete set of the guidelines, with history and links, see id.
17. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, tit. 1, § 103(a), (b) (1988) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 667 (2006)).
18. See http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/proposed/2009/csg-july.htm. As part of the 1988
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From Table I we can see that if income is $3,000, child support will be
around $300, or around 10% of income. At $8,000, child support will be
about $575, or only 7%. Like most states, Indiana uses the Income Shares
(IS) rule.' 9 Indiana reviewed several approaches before settling on the
income shares rule, which is generally perceived by the public as being
fair to all parties involved. As we will show below, it also provides the
least harm in terms of divorce incentives. The IS model is based on the
intuitive idea that the child support obligation (the estimated cost of rais-
ing the additional child) should be shared between the parents in terms of
their relative incomes. The income of both parents is added together
(making various adjustments) and taken to the support tables to determine
the "costs of supporting" the child(ren).20 This payment is then prorated
between the parents based on their relative share of the adjusted income.2'
Deviations are allowed for such things as union dues, elderly support,
extraordinary expenses, noncustodial medical expenses, prior support
payments, and the like.
Fair as it is considered to be, Indiana's income share model is not per-
fect. As with all states that use child support guidelines, no consideration
is given for the value of physical custody. As we have noted already, chil-
dren are considered only a cost. Taken together, income share states like
Indiana have a number of incentive effects that tend to offset each other.
Child support awards based on Espenshade expenditure estimates tend to
be considerably higher than those allocated under the previous "needs of
the child" standard. Higher support awards tend to reduce the incentive of
potential noncustodial parents to initiate a divorce in order to capture mar-
ital wealth. This is particularly true in the case of the small number of what
we call "deadbeat dads," those parents who gain satisfaction from merely
knowing they have children, rather than spending time with them.
On the other hand, given that the Indiana support awards are reasonably
legislation, states are mandated to review their guidelines every four years. Although there is a
tremendous amount of inertia, several states have changed their guidelines over time, and the
level of change is growing over time. Changes include different methods to calculate child
expenditures, changes to the sharing rule, and provision for many exceptions and grounds for
deviation. The requirement for review is a feature of a good child-support-guideline system.
The ones considered in Indiana include U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY
FAMILIES: 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, 2007; DAVID BETSON, REPORT TO STATE OF OREGON
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, STATE OF OREGON CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES REVIEW: UPDATED
OBLIGATION SCALES AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, 2006, available at http://www.in.gov/judi-
ciary/rules/child-support/.
19. At the moment, there are thirty-nine states with income shares systems.
20. Work-related child care expenses and the weekly costs of health insurance premiums
for the child(ren) are then added to the basic child support obligation.
21. The Income Shares Model was developed by The Institute for Court Management of the
National Center for State Courts under the Child Support Guidelines Project. U.S. Dep't HHS,
OCSE Development of Guidelines for Child Support Enforcement: Final Report 1 (1987).
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designed around the expenditures spent on children, that these estimates
have generally stood the test of time, and that the support awards fall as a
fraction of total income with increases in total income, an income share
state like Indiana does not transfer excessive amounts of wealth to custo-
dial parents. Thus, although custodial parents gain significant utility from
physical custody, 22 they do not receive any additional benefit through net
wealth transfers. In our opinion, these characteristics of income share
states make them a good example of a workable child-support guideline.
B. Alaska: The Bad
Prior to the federal government mandating support guidelines, several
states-Wisconsin, in particular-had been experimenting with guide-
lines within the context of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) cases. In these situations, it was often the case that the custodial
parent had no private income at all, the noncustodial parent had no con-
tact with the children, and everyone involved was at or below the pover-
ty line. Under these circumstances, a simple guideline rule was easy to
implement and was completely appropriate. The rule thus developed in
Wisconsin became known as the percentage-of-obligor-income model (or
the Wisconsin model).23 Once again, standards of living were based on
Espenshade measures, but the actual support payments were calculated by
simply multiplying the noncustodial parent's income (again, the only
non-AFDC income in these families) by some fraction based on the num-
ber of children. Given that these early cases were dealing with small
ranges of income, these fractions were held constant as incomes rose.
It would appear to be an unfortunate twist of history that when the fed-
eral government mandated guidelines to be in place by 1989, several
states looked around, found the Wisconsin model, and decided to apply
those straightforward guidelines to their states for all income levels.24
What may have been appropriate for families close to the poverty line,
however, is likely inappropriate for families with higher incomes. Such
22. The additional utility of rationally expecting custody is what drives women in margin-
al marriages to file for divorce. See Margaret F. Brinig and Douglas W. Allen, These Boots Are
Made for Walking: Why Most Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AMER. & EcoN. REv. 126-29
(2000).
23. It should be pointed out that Wisconsin today uses a model much different from the
model with its name.
24. It might not be a complete coincidence, for by then feminist scholar Martha Fineman,
who taught at the University of Wisconsin, had published several influential pieces concerning
the poverty and inequality problems facing divorced women. By 1991, her The Illusion of
Equality 51-63 discussed the Wisconsin reforms in the 1970s and 1980s as having sought rule
equality rather than actual equality. But Fineman's Implementing Equality: Ideology,
Contradiction and Social Change, Wis. L. REv. 789 (1983) mostly noted the hardship divorce
caused for women and the inability of original reformers to predict it.
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was the case with the guidelines adopted in Alaska. Hence, in Alaska, a
wealthy family pays the same fraction of income toward child support that
a poor family does, even though Engel's law shows that these expenditure
shares should fall. In the case of Alaska, the difference between their pay-
ment schedule and Indiana's is apparent from Figure 2.
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The horizontal axis measures weekly adjusted earnings. Note that until
$1,000/week, the two states have comparable levels of support. However,
as income continues to increase, a deviation begins. To the extent that the
Indiana payments are a better reflection of the true costs of children (what
we call "good"), the difference amounts to spousal support. When com-
bined with the utility generated from custody that all the guidelines
ignore, a strong divorce incentive (or a "potential custodial parent sur-
plus") is created for a particular type of family, one with a high-earning
spouse.
Under the percentage-of-obligor-income system, a potential noncusto-
dial parent with a high income has little incentive to divorce. Through
divorce, this parent loses contact with the children and makes a significant
net wealth transfer to the custodial parent. The opposite is true for poten-
tial custodial parents. As the potential noncustodial parent's income
increases, there is an increasing incentive to divorce in order to capture
both the benefits of custody and the transfer of wealth. This negative fea-
ture of Percentage of Obligor Income guidelines has been mentioned
throughout the periodic reviews,25 and, as a result, several of these states,
25. It has been a frequent subject of discussion on noncustodial parents' Internet websites.
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like Georgia, have changed either to income shares models or altered the
linear payment structure.
C. Canada: The Ugly
Canada provides an extreme example of how a child support system
can get off track and create truly counterproductive incentives when
incentives are not considered. Canada came late to the guideline game.
Discussions at the federal Department of Justice (DOJ) did not begin in
earnest until Kim Campbell2 6 became finance minister in 1990. Campbell
lost little time and organized the National Symposium of Women, the Law
and the Administration of Justice conference in 1991.27 No ordinary con-
ference, the participant list included the attorneys general of each
province, judges from every court level, deans from most Canadian law
schools, and leaders of most feminist organizations in the country. The
symposium dealt explicitly with the concept of guidelines and claimed
that in such developments "Women needed to be formally consulted
regarding the adequacy of any guidelines before they are distributed or
implemented."28 But, most significantly, at the end of the conference a
resolution was passed and accepted by the DOJ that the:
Department of Justice would henceforth represent only feminist legal argu-
ments in any future constitutional cases and would consult with feminists on
any future appointments to the Judiciary, Administrative Tribunals, etc.29
By 1997, almost a decade after guidelines were introduced within the
United States, Canada produced a set of guideline tables, with extensive
add-ons, and very limited discretion to deviate. 30 The feminist motivation
to transfer as much possible income to the custodial family drove the
design process.31 In terms of cost functions, sharing rules, and modifica-
See, e.g., Alliance for Non-custodial Parents Rights, http://ancpr.com/category/child-support/;
http://www.lowersupport.com/stepsjtolower-support.htm. R. Mark Rogers, Wisconsin-Style
and Income Shares Child Support Guidelines: Excessive Burdens and Flawed Economic
Foundation, 33 FAM. L.Q. 135 (1999).
26. Canada's by then twice-divorced and to date only female prime minister (for four
months in 1993).
27. See Douglas W. Allen, The Anatomy of Canada's Child Support Guidelines: The
Effects, Details, and History of a Feminist Family Policy in HANDBOOK ON THE LAW AND
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY (Lloyd Cohen & Joshua D. Wright eds., forthcoming).
28. The DOJ produced three volumes of materials based on this conference that heavily
influenced the formal work done on the guidelines. Department of Justice, Proceedings of the
Symposium (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992a); Recommendations from
the Symposium (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992b).
29. See Allen, supra note 27 for a full history.
30. Department of Justice, The Survey of Child Support Awards: Final Analysis of Pilot
Data and Recommendations for Continued Data Collection, CSR 1999 2e, p.54, Fig. 17.
31. See generally Allen, supra note 27.
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tions, the Canadian guidelines speak with one voice: wealth transfer.32
The Family Law Committee (FLC) of the DOJ considered several
expenditure approaches, but settled on a linear equivalence scale used by
Statistics Canada to assist in poverty measures (again, correct for these
income levels as they were in Wisconsin).33 Known as the 40/30 rule, the
equivalence formula is 1.4 + .3(n-2).34 This function provided the largest
levels of child expenditures of any at the committee's disposal. Using
the linear 40/30 rule in the neighborhood of poverty incomes leads to
small errors, but as one moves away from the level of income used to
arrive at them, the magnitude of the errors increase if the 40/30 rule is
inappropriate. By its construction, the 40/30 is likely to over-estimate
costs for large families where the income is high.36
In addition, Canada chose a form of the Percentage of Obligor Income
model called the Revised Fixed Percentage. The general idea of the rule
was to share the post-separation costs of the child when the parents'
incomes are equal, and use this as the basis of a fixed percentage
approach. It is useful to examine the actual formula, which is:
Disposable Income of NCP = Disposable Income of CP/[1.4 + .3(n-2)]
The formula assumes the noncustodial parent's disposable income is
deflated by 1, meaning a single parent has expenses identical to a sin-
gle individual who is not a parent. Taken together, this formula can
amount to relatively large transfers. This can be seen in Figure 3.
32. For example, the noncustodial parent is assumed to have zero child-related costs until
custody is at 40% of the time.
33. The Finnie et al., report recognizes the scale used was intended for low incomes only:
.... most of the established scales apply-strictly speaking-only to incomes at the pover-
ty (or "low income") line. This is because most of the scales have been constructed to
derive poverty lines, and are not necessarily intended for making comparisons of well-
being at other income levels. Finnie, Ross, Carolina Giliberti, and Daniel Stripinis. An
Overview of the Research Program to Develop a Canadian Child Support Formula.
(Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1995).
34. It is important to realize that this function was never designed to work for all households
and was not recommended by the economists working on the guidelines. Rather, their opinions
were overturned by the bureaucrats in the DOJ.
35. The Australian government, over the past several years, has conducted extensive
research into their own expenditure functions and estimations elsewhere. Among the many
equivalence scales estimated in Australia, most are close to 1.2 + .15(n-2), exactly half of that
used in the Canadian system. In the UK, their guidelines are based on an equivalence scale
of 1.15 + .05(n-2). M. Gray, Costs of Children and Equivalence Scales: A Review of
Methodological Issues and Australian Estimates, 13(1) AusTRAL. J. OF LABOUR EcONOMICS
99-115 (2010).
36. Added to this is the "extra-expense" clause in the Canadian guidelines. Extra-expenses
are shared between the parents in proportion to their relative incomes. What constitutes an
extra-expense has become a major source of litigation. The extra-expense provision amounts to
double-counting since the guidelines were created based on all expenses.
37. While this might be true in the case where the noncustodial parent did not spend time
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V. Divorce Incentive Effects
As mentioned, a common assumption within the guideline policy liter-
ature is that expenditures on children are linear with respect to income.
Under this assumption, IS and PO models are equivalent. For example,
consider the example in Table 2. Here two households experience a
divorce, and the only difference between them is the custodial parent's
income. In one case, the noncustodial parent earns $60,000 per year and
the custodial parent earns nothing. In the other case, each earns $60,000,
and in both cases child costs are assumed to be 25% of income. In the first
case, the noncustodial parent pays $15,000 in child support, regardless of
whether residence is in a PO or IS state since the child support is .25 x
$60,000. In the second case, the total child costs are $30,000 and split
50/50, and so the noncustodial child support amount in the IS state is also
$15,000. In this second case, had the couple lived in a PO state, the child
support payment would still have been $15,000. Hence, the noncustodial
parent theoretically pays the same support in all cases. The higher incomes
in the second household imply an off-setting higher cost of children, result-
ing in the same payment.
As discussed, however, in practice, IS and PO states generally make
different assumptions regarding the relationship between child expendi-
tures and income.38 As family income increases, expenditures on children
with the child or have the child visit, it of course ignores car seats, extra beds, extra food for the
weekend, and so forth.
38. The assumption made within IS states reflects the empirical reality. See David Donaldson
Figure 3: Child Support Payments for
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Table 2
PO System PO System IS System IS System
CP Income 0 $60,000 0 $60,000
NCP Income $60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $60,000
Child .25*60k .25*60k 1 (.25*60k .5 (.25*120k)
Support = $15,000 = $15,000 = $15,000 = $15,000
do increase, but the fraction of expenditures to total income is falling, and
only the IS states consider this. Let's consider altering the example above
to the numbers shown in Table 3. Suppose that when each parent earns
$60,000 the child costs are only 20% of total income, rather than 25%, or
$24,000. Now the noncustodial share would be $12,000 in the income-
sharing state, but remains at $15,000 in an obligor state. The custodial
parent would end up assuming $9,000 in actual child support, rather than
$12,000 received.
Table 3
PO System PO System IS System IS System
CP Income 0 $60,000 0 $60,000
NCP Income $60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $60,000
Total Child $15,000 $24,000 $15,000 $24,000
Costs
NCP Child .25*60k = .25*60k = 1 (.25*60k = .5 (.2*120k)
Support $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 = $12,000
Implicit CP 0 $9,000 0 $12,000
Support
In effect, if the percentages are set to mimic child-related expenses at
low incomes, the obligor law subsidizes more and more nonchild-related
expenses in the custodial household as the average cost of children falls
with income. If the fraction of total income allocated to child costs falls
with increases in income, then it is necessary to use the total family
income to calculate child costs, and not just the noncustodial income. Of
course, the PO guidelines do not do this.
Until very recently, all but one PO state had linear cost functions for
& Krishna Pendakur, Equivalent-Expenditure Functions and Expenditure-Dependent
Equivalent Scales, 88 J. OF PUB. EcON. 175-288 (2004).
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children. In Alaska, for example, the child support award is 20% of the
noncustodial income for one child, 27% for two children, 33% for three
children, etc. There is no cap on child support awards, and the percent-
age of income is constant across low- and high-income levels. On the
other hand, thirty of the IS states have realized this problem and have
cost functions where average child costs fall with increases in income. 3 9
Thus, PO states end up penalizing households where one member earns
a significant amount of income. This transfer amounts to a form of hid-
den spousal support.40
The second critical feature of guidelines in terms of divorce incentives
stems from their (ubiquitous) failure to account for the utility generated
by custody of children. When designing the various types of guidelines,
children are assumed to be a cost to the custodial household-a drain on
welfare because children impede remarriage and participation in the labor
force. Under such an assumption, it makes sense for the noncustodial
household to compensate for this extra burden. However, this fails to rec-
ognize that children are often the most valuable family asset, and that
much of the utility that arises over children does not come from simple
procreation, but rather from contact and involvement with one's own chil-
dren on a day-to-day basis. It is the relationship between parent and child
that is often the most valuable attribute of parenthood. The relationship is
not a public good in the dissolving marriage, as it may be when the cou-
ple is together and both parents are sharing in the joys and tribulations of
child rearing. Not counting custody as a gain in the calculation of child
support means that guidelines will tend to "double count" the award for
custody.4 1 Within a PO state, the custodial parent of a wealthy noncusto-
dial parent gets the utility from custody, plus a high cash transfer to fund
the child expenses. As some see it, it is similar to one side retaining own-
39. ANDREA H. BELLER & JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE EcONOMICS OF CHILD
SUPPORT 200 (1993). For example, in Arizona, child costs are assumed to be 23.8% if monthly
joint income is $700 month, but this falls to 20.2% if monthly income is $2,500 per month.
40. Under U.S. tax law, there are often considerable advantages to custodial households in
obligor states as well, because the custodial parent is the head of a household and able to claim
a larger standardized deductions. The custodial parent is likely the only one who can claim the
dependent exemptions, and custodial parents are the only ones eligible for child tax credits, such
as children's tax exemptions, earned income tax credits, and dependent care tax credits. This
was a considerable issue early on in the development of guidelines, but most states now make
adjustments for this. Under the period we examine, PO states systematically transfer more
income to the custodial home, especially for high-income levels. R. Mark Rogers & Donald J.
Bieniewicz, Child Support Guidelines: Underlying Methodologies, Assumptions, and the
Impact on Standards of Living in LAW & EcoNoMics OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS (W.
Comanor ed., 2004).
41. "Double counting" is a phrase often used by noncustodial parent rights groups to get at
what they believe is an over-payment. Namely, they argue that they both lose custody and have
to pay support.
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ership over the family car, while the other side continues paying for the
fuel and maintenance without hope of recouping on resale.
Prior to the introduction of support guidelines, child support awards
were considered inappropriately low in many policy circles. However, the
lower amounts may well have reflected the courts' awareness that the cus-
todial parent obtained custody over one of the most valuable assets of the
marriage: the children. Perhaps the main complaint of noncustodial par-
ents under the guideline system is the lack of contact they have with their
children.4 2 The various effects of wealth transfer caused by guidelines can
be summarized in Table 3. When child support awards are given under the
"needs of child" doctrine, the custodial parent has a reduced incentive to
leave because of the low child support award. Although the custodial par-
ent gained the utility of keeping custody, this came at a cost since the
courts implicitly recognized the utility gain and the child support awards
were small. For the average, "involved," noncustodial parent, the incen-
tives to divorce under "needs of child" were also probably small.
Payments would be low, but the large lossof utility over custody remains.
Interestingly, for those noncustodial parents not interested in parenthood
(e.g., the dead-beat dad), such "needs of child" awards would have
encouraged abandonment of the family, since such parents would only be
concerned with the (relatively lower) payments.
Table 4
Custodial Parent Noncustodial Parent
Needs of Child Small Large
Income Shares Small Small
Percent-of- Large Small
Obligor Income
Income share awards create minimal incentives for either party to
leave. Given their design, the custodial parent does not receive a signifi-
cant net transfer of wealth because (i) their income is included in the cal-
culation of the award, and (ii) most IS states assume that child costs
decline with total family income. Hence the custodial parent may gain
custody, but the cash award likely just covers the cost of the child. On the
other hand, the noncustodial parent loses any utility from custody. The
42. See, e.g., Roger F. Gay, High Child Support Awards Deny Contact between Fathers and
Their Children, http://www.fathermag.com/003/child-support/ (last viewed Nov. 17, 2010).
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dead-beat dad, as well as the involved parent, must pay a relatively larger
child support award. As a result, the noncustodial parent in an IS state also
has no strong incentive to divorce.
With the Percent of Income (PO) model, however, the divorce incen-
tives are the opposite of the "needs of child" case. Now the custodial par-
ent has a strong incentive to divorce since all factors included in the
guidelines create a transfer of wealth: the custodial parent obtains custody
and a cash award that overcompensates for costs, especially for high
incomes. The noncustodial parent in this case is less interested in divorce
since the payments are high and the utility over custody is lost.43
VI. The Proof Is in the Pudding
We have conducted formal empirical work elsewhere investigating the
size of these incentive effects on divorce in the United States. In particu-
lar we have exploited the following empirical propositions.
1. Switching from "Needs of Child" to PO awards should increase
divorce rates.
a. Divorce rates should be higher when noncustodial parent pre-
divorce income is higher.
b. Divorce rates should be unaffected by the custodial parent's
predivorce income.
2. Switching from "Needs of Child" to IS awards should decrease
divorce rates.
a. Income levels of both the noncustodial and custodial parents
should not impact divorce rates.
3. Divorce rates should be independent of child support system for
couples without children.
We find strong evidence for these predictions. Allen and Brinig test
these predictions for the United States using data from (National
Longitudinal Survey) (1979) (NLSY). Individuals are followed from the
time they first marry, until they either divorce or the year 2002 is
reached." The NLSY data set follows individuals, and so individual
characteristics, such as age, level of education, income and religion, can
43. If there were no costs to negotiate different splits within an efficient marriage, then none
of these different guidelines would have made any difference. PO states would just mean an
increase in wealth within the marriage to the potential custodial parent. However, transaction
costs are positive in marriage and divorce, and as a result the rules matter.
44. We followed individuals until 2002 in order to provide a sufficiently long sample, but
to avoid the changes in guidelines that took place over the past eight years. See Douglas W.
Allen & Margaret F. Brinig, Child Support Guidelines and Divorce Incentives (working paper,
2010).
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be controlled. As is often the case, we find that divorce probabilities rise
and then fall with the length of marriage and the age of the individual;
education levels and income have strong negative effects on divorce
probabilities for both spouses; and some type of religious affiliation has
a small but negative effect on divorce probabilities. Figure 4 presents our
key finding for income share states-what we have called the "good"
guideline system.









In this stylized graph (based on regression results), increases in the
potential noncustodial spousal income lowers the probability of
divorce-more income is stabilizing. After 1988, when the IS guidelines
were introduced, this income effect was marginally reinforced. The size
of the effect is very small, and it is not statistically significant. In other
words, with the income shares system, changes to noncustodial income
(and to custodial income) essentially have no bearing on divorce proba-
bilities.
Contrast this with Figure 5, which shows what actually happened in PO
states. These states had a smaller income effect to begin with, but now the
effect of changes to noncustodial income has a destabilizing effect.
Indeed, for a $100,000 change in income to the potential noncustodial par-
ent's income, there was an increase in just over 1% in the divorce rate.
This effect was large enough to offset the generally stabilizing effect of
income on divorce.
That is the effect of the good and the bad. Figure 6 shows the amazing
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results for the Ugly.45 In Canada, the effect of the large transfers of wealth
to custodial parents is quite dramatic. Unlike the case in the United States,
in Canada the effect of child support guidelines had a nonlinear impact on
the income effect. The larger the change in income to the potential non-
custodial parent, the larger was the impact on divorce probabilities.
Amazingly, a $100,000 change in income led to the divorce rate increas-
ing by 10%. This size is comparable to the entire effect of no-fault divorce
on divorce rates. The income effect is very strong in Canada, and so over
the range of income estimated, even with the guidelines, more income
remained a stabilizing feature of the marriage.
VII. Conclusion
Family law reformers over the last forty years have been enormously
successful in some ways, and have fallen short in others. One important
insight that economics can lend to any discussion is that incentives mat-
ter. While the divorce rate in the United States has fallen over the past
twenty years, only a very few unscrupulous attorneys would object to
that.46 Other things being equal, a lower divorce rate improves welfare
45. These results were based on the Statistics Canada SLID data set. This panel followed
individuals through the 1997 transition, in an experiment structured the same way as Allen and
Brinig. Douglas W. Allen, The Effect on Divorce of Legislated Net-Wealth Transfers: The Case
of Canada's Child Support Guidelines, 23(3) J. L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 580--97 (2007).
46. Meaning those who object to the loss in their potential fees for handling divorces.








since children tend to be disadvantaged by divorce. Further, perhaps the
decreasing rates of divorce mean that married families are happier. On the
other hand, very few would suggest distorting the incentives toward
divorce in otherwise stable marriages is a good idea. We suggest, based
upon twenty years of data from the United States and Canada, that some
well-intentioned child-support-guideline measures have actually encour-
aged divorce by compensating custodial parents beyond the amounts actu-
ally needed for their children's support. The tremendous injustice felt by
noncustodial parents has translated into attempts to mandate joint cus-
tody,4 7 as well as, at least in part, contributing to the problems of enforc-
ing delinquent child support from what most dub "deadbeat dads."4 8
At a minimum, since it is clear that no state wants to take on the for-
midable problems of valuing time with children, let alone subtracting for
emotional losses and gains of parents from money needed to purchase
adequate support, we propose that states and other governments working
on these problems consider that proportionate shares of household income
allocated to children decline after income reaches approximately $5,000 a
month and that both parents' incomes should factor into calculations of
47. See Allen & Brinig, Child Support Guidelines, supra note 44. See also Douglas W.
Allen & Margaret F. Brinig, Do Joint Parenting Laws Make Any Difference? J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUDIES 304 (2011).
48. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, The Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 201-32 (1996).
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basic obligations.49 For the many states that do have such regimes in place
(income shares plus schedules reflecting Engel's law), we encourage stay-
ing on course and applaud frequent reference to the latest government
economic calculations on household expenditures.
49. We do understand as well that many parents exceed guideline amounts, sometimes as
the result of state-mandated contribution for child health care and health insurance costs as well
as such things as agreed-upon payment for college beyond the age of majority. On the other
hand, they also negotiate for tax advantages, such as personal exemptions that may go to the
noncustodial parent. In other words, guidelines provide the minimum payments, and couples
negotiate beyond them.
